Horizontal contracts in a dominant firm-competitive fringe model by Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Horizontal contracts in a dominant
firm-competitive fringe model
Antelo, Manel and Bru, Lluís




MPRA Paper No. 105774, posted 08 Feb 2021 11:10 UTC
 
 
Horizontal contracts in a dominant firm-competitive fringe model* 
 
  Manel Antelo 
Departamento de Fundamentos da Análise Económica, Universidade de Santiago de 
Compostela, Campus Norte, 15782 Santiago de Compostela, Spain  
 
Lluís Bru 
Departament d’Economia de l’Empresa, Universitat de les Illes Balears, Campus Cra. de 
Valldemossa, km. 7, 07122 Palma de Mallorca, Spain  
 
Abstract 
This paper offers a rationale for production subcontracting by a market power firm from smaller firms 
despite the latter’s ability to sell the good for themselves. Particularly, in a dominant firm (DF) model in 
which the good can be sold through linear pricing or through nonlinear two-part tariff (2PT) contracts, we 
demonstrate that the DF finds it optimal, whenever it sells its own production plus outsourced production, 
to subcontract production from fringe firms by setting nonlinear 2PT contracts.  
 
Keywords: Dominant firm model, linear prices, nonlinear 2PT contracts, horizontal 
subcontracting, welfare 
JEL Classification: L11, L14 
 
 
                                                 
* This paper has benefited from comments from R. Caminal, D. Cardona-Coll, M. González-Maestre and J.M. 
Ordóñez de Haro. Financial aid from the Xunta de Galicia through the projects titled Consolidación e Estruturación – 
2016 GPC GI-2060 AEMI and 2019 GRC GI-2060 AEMI, and from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science 
(Grant ECO2013-48496-C4-1-R) is acknowledged. 
 2 
1. Introduction  
The traditional dominant firm-competitive fringe textbook model of price leadership can be 
sketched out as follows (Shepherd, 1997; Carlton and Perloff, 2000). The dominant firm (DF), 
which knows the market demand, sets a price that takes into account the response of a set of 
fringe (price-taking) firms at any price. This allows the DF to determine residual demand, 
defined as the difference between market demand and the collective supply function of fringe 
firms at any price that the DF chooses. The DF ultimately decides the optimal price. This model 
fits well to a number of industries, and especially those emerging from restructuring processes, 
where the incumbent is obliged to sell a portion of its capacity to different firms and newly 
independent producers (Kahai et al., 1996; Rassenti and Wilson, 2003; Gowrisankan and 
Holmes, 2004; Bonacina and Gulli, 2007).  
Subcontracting production among firms when each is capable of producing and marketing 
independently is quite common in industries in which there is a large (market-power) firm 
competing with a set of smaller firms (Spiegel, 1993; Baake et al., 1999). However, this strategy 
consisting of the large firm acquiring production, rather than capacity, from its rivals in the 
same stage of the industry, cannot be rationalized in the standard dominant firm-competitive 
fringe model in which it is assumed that all firms sell their production through a uniform or 
linear price. Particularly, Newbery (1984) showed that forward contracts are not utilized by the 
DF if all firms are risk-neutral, since firms on the fringe would freeride on the DF, making it 
unprofitable for the DF to subcontract production from the fringe.1  
In this paper, we demonstrate the usefulness of the dominant firm-competitive fringe model to 
rationalize the practice of production subcontracting if we depart from its basic formulation. 
This allows us to simulate and reconcile the potential and merits of this model to industries 
better adjusted to that model than to the oligopoly model. This model has recently been applied 
to landmark antitrust cases referring to Standard Oil and Alcoa and, more recently, to the 
analysis of deregulated markets for electric power (Wilson and Rassenti, 2004). We particularly 
extend the basic DF model by assuming that firms are not restricted to selling the good through 
linear or uniform price contracts, but can use nonlinear two-part tariff (2PT) contracts. We also 
assume that there is some intra-consumer heterogeneity regarding the marginal value of each 
unit of consumption, such that a firm cannot extract all consumer surplus if selling the good 
through linear pricing contracts, but only through nonlinear 2PT contracts.   
                                                 
1 Allaz and Vila (1993) show that firms would use forward contracts in a Cournot setting as a way to strategically 
increase market share, leading to fiercer competition that would benefit consumers. 
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In a previous paper (Antelo and Bru, 2020), we demonstrate that if nonlinear contracts are 
feasible, the DF, but not the fringe firms, will use them to sell its production: in other words, the 
DF practices price discrimination. In this current paper, we show that this encourages the DF to 
“monopolize” sales by purchasing capacity from fringe firms and becoming their distributor in 
the market. We consider two kinds of contracts for purchasing production capacity, one 
equivalent to a merger and the other equivalent to horizontal subcontracting. The DF’s incentive 
to set capacity contracts equivalent to a merger emerge when it is restricted to selling its 
production to end users through linear pricing, as was pointed out by Gowrisankaran and 
Holmes (2004). A market-power firm restricted to using linear prices with consumers finds it 
optimal to acquire production capacity from the competitive fringe. Our novel finding in this 
paper is that the DF’s incentive to acquire capacity from the fringe persists when the output is 
sold through nonlinear 2PT contracts, and is even reinforced with respect to the case in which 
this selling method is not allowed.  
Regarding subcontracting practices (forward contracts), two findings emerge from our model. 
First, unlike what Newbery (1984) argued, we show that selling the good through nonlinear 2PT 
contracts leads the DF to set forward contracts with fringe firms. Second, and contrary to Allaz 
and Vila (1993), this yields a less competitive outcome. Hence, our results on forward 
contracting parallel previous findings that cast doubt on the pro-competitive effects of such 
contracts (Antelo and Bru, 2002; Mahenc and Salanie, 2004). Moreover, subcontracting with 
the fringe does not seek to foreclose the market, since fringe firms are already established and 
there is nothing to prevent them from selling directly to consumers. Indeed, fringe firms’ profits 
increase when such contracts are allowed, since the outside option for consumers becomes less 
attractive. Fringe firms can thus charge higher prices if they choose to sell in the product 
market. This ultimately leads the DF to offer an attractive contract for the fringe firms not to sell 
directly to consumers. In sum, it is the consumers who, on seeing their surplus reduced, lose out. 
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. In Section 2 we set out the model. In 
Section 3 we discuss the impact of horizontal subcontracting by the DF. In Section 4 we make 
some final remarks and discuss directions of future research. An appendix contains the proofs of 
the results. 
2. The model 
Consider an industry selling a homogeneous good comprised of a dominant firm (DF) and a set 
of price-taking firms, collectively known as the fringe. We start by detailing preferences, 
technology and market interaction in this industry.  
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Preferences. There is a continuum of symmetric and homogeneous consumers of size one, with 
preferences given by the same quasi-linear utility function 𝑢𝑢(𝑞𝑞,𝑚𝑚) = 𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) + 𝑚𝑚, where 𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) 
represents utility derived from consumption of the good and 𝑚𝑚 stands for the numeraire. As 
usual, 𝑈𝑈(0) = 0, 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) > 0, 𝑈𝑈′′(𝑞𝑞) < 0, and 𝜌𝜌 ≡ − 𝑈𝑈′′′(𝑞𝑞)𝑞𝑞𝑈𝑈′′(𝑞𝑞) < 2.2  
Technology. The industry comprises 𝐾𝐾 production plants, which we normalize to 𝐾𝐾 = 1. Both 
the DF and fringe firms have the same cost function per plant, 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄),3 which is assumed to 
satisfy 𝑐𝑐(0) = 0, 𝑐𝑐′(𝑄𝑄) > 0, and 𝑐𝑐′′(𝑄𝑄) > 0. The number of plants belonging to the fringe as a 
whole is 1 − 𝑘𝑘, so 𝑘𝑘 plants are in hands of the DF. 
Market interaction. The interaction between the DF, fringe firms and consumers follows the 
standard treatment described in textbooks.4 The difference is that all firms are not restricted to 
sell the good through linear pricing contracts, but can also do it through nonlinear two-part tariff 
(2PT) contracts. Moreover, horizontal contracts can be agreed among them.  
The timing of the game we consider is as follows: 
1. The DF can sell production 𝑞𝑞 for a payment 𝑇𝑇(𝑞𝑞) = 𝐹𝐹 + 𝑝𝑝𝑞𝑞, where 𝐹𝐹 = 0 if prices are 
restricted to be linear or 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 0 if nonlinear 2PT contracts are allowed. The DF also offers 
exclusive or nonexclusive contracts to fringe firms to acquire production from them. All 
contracts are offered simultaneously. 
2. Consumers accept or reject the DF’s contract. Those who accept it can consume quantity 𝑞𝑞 
that maximizes consumer surplus, i.e., that verifies 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑝𝑝.  
3. Fringe firms observe the type of contract the DF chooses to sell the good and simultaneously 
decide whether to accept or reject the DF’s production contracts. The fringe firms not receiving 
a DF offer and those rejecting the DF’s offer simultaneously decide the number of consumers 
they will supply and the type of contract (linear pricing contract or nonlinear 2PT contract).  
4. The DF delivers the good to (residual) consumers not served by the fringe. 
To evaluate inefficiencies, we consider, as the first-best scenario, the aggregate welfare 
achieved when the quantity produced and consumed in the industry is that which solves the 
                                                 
2 Condition 𝜌𝜌 < 2 is the usual restriction on the convexity of the demand function to ensure that the second order 
condition of the monopolist’s problem is satisfied. See, for instance, Mrázová and Neary (2017). 
3 Most of our results hold if we allow the DF to have a different technology in its plants provided this still leads to an 
increasing and strictly convex cost function. However, our assumption of the same technology across firms allows us 
to simplify the discussion of comparative statics when we change how production capacity is distributed between the 
DF and fringe firms. 
4 See, for instance, Carlton and Perloff (1994) and Gowrisankaran and Holmes (2004). 
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problem max𝑞𝑞,𝑄𝑄  {𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄)} , 𝑞𝑞 ≤ 𝑄𝑄. It is straightforward to see that: (i) 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 𝑘𝑘, i.e., the 
number of consumers served by the DF in the first-best scenario is proportional to its share of 
plants in the industry;5 (ii) each buyer consumes quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 satisfying 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� = 𝑐𝑐′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�; 
and (iii) the consumer surplus amounts to 𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓. Finally, note that a 
competitive market would implement this outcome. 
3. Does the dominant firm subcontract production from fringe firms? 
A well-known result when the DF sells the good through uniform pricing is that it never 
subcontracts production from the fringe unless it enjoys some cost advantage (Newbery, 1984). 
In our set-up, the DF has no cost advantage over fringe firms, but it does end up selling the good 
through nonlinear 2PT contracts – unlike the fringe firms, which resort to linear pricing (Antelo 
and Bru, 2020). Can this difference in selling procedure incentivize the DF to contract 
production from the fringe? And if so, what is the welfare impact of this horizontal 
subcontracting coupled with price discrimination?  
To investigate these issues, we assume that the DF can acquire production from fringe firms on 
an exclusive or nonexclusive basis. Nonexclusive contracts are equivalent to forward contracts 
or horizontal subcontracting, whereas exclusive contracts are strategically equivalent to a 
merger. Let 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 denote the number of horizontal contracts chosen by the DF, i.e., the number of 
fringe firms with which a contract is established. If the DF acquires the entire production of 
those firms, the customers of the remaining fringe firms consume quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 that satisfies 
 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� = 𝑐𝑐′�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓�,  (1) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 = (1−𝑎𝑎)𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐  is the quantity these fringe firms are willing to produce, with 𝑎𝑎 the number 
of customers of the DF. From Eq. (1) it can be shown that, in equilibrium, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 is a function of 𝑎𝑎 
and 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐, in such a way that  
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 = 𝑐𝑐′′𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓(1−𝑎𝑎)𝑐𝑐′′−(1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)𝑈𝑈′′ > 0                              (2) 
and 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = − 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 < 0.                             (3) 
                                                 
5 The superscript 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 denotes first-best. 
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A nonexclusive contract between the DF and a fringe firm (horizontal subcontracting) is a 
contract that allows the fringe firm to participate in the final market with the amount of 
noncontracted production. Therefore, for each subcontracted unit of product the DF must pay 
the same price as the fringe firms charge their consumers, 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 = 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�, and the DF must 
purchase the quantity that such firms are willing to produce at that price, 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓. Thus, if the DF 
signs nonexclusive contracts with 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 fringe firms, its profit is 
 𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 (𝑎𝑎, 𝑞𝑞, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐) = 𝑎𝑎�𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓)−𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�� − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓.          (4) 
Contrariwise, an exclusive contract between the DF and a fringe firm (a merger) prevents that 
fringe firm from selling directly to consumers. Hence, if the DF signs exclusive contracts with 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 fringe firms, the remaining fringe firms have profits  𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐) = 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓�,                                  (5) 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 follows from Eq. (1). For fringe firms to accept an exclusive contract {𝑓𝑓,𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐} paying 𝑓𝑓 
for production 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐, that contract must satisfy 𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐) ≥ 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐).                                            (6) 
Hence, the DF pays 𝑓𝑓 = 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐) + 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐) and its profit amounts to 
𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 (𝑎𝑎, 𝑞𝑞, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐) = 𝑎𝑎 �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�� − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 � − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐) + 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)� .     (7) 
Since the DF minimizes production costs 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 � + 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐) when production is the same in 
the DF’s and the subcontracted fringe firms’ plants, 
𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 = 𝑄𝑄𝑐𝑐, then the profit stated in Eq. 
(7) can be rewritten  as 
𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 (𝑎𝑎, 𝑞𝑞, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐) = 𝑎𝑎�𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�� − (𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐 � 𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘+𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐� − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐).    (8) 
We next investigate the industry outcome in different scenarios depending on the type of 
contract that the DF sets with consumers and with fringe firms. 
4.1 The DF offers nonexclusive contracts to fringe firms and sells its own and outsourced 
production through linear pricing 
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In this set-up, the DF acquires 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 units of product from the fringe at price 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 and sells its total 
output (own plus outsourced production) to 𝑎𝑎 customers through linear contracts. Customers of 
the fringe consume quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 that satisfies Eq. (1), and the DF’s customers receive the same 
quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 . Therefore, the DF maximizes profits given in Eq. (4) with 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓, namely, 
max
{𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐}𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 �𝑎𝑎, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 , 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐� = 𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓                                      .                (9) 
We define the DF’s total production as 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 ≡ 𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓. There are many different equivalent 
combinations {𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐} with the same impact on the fringe firms’ offer to consumers, provided 
that Eq. (1) can be written as 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� = 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷1−𝑘𝑘 �; hence, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 becomes a function of 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷, and the 
DF’s profits as given in Eq. (9) can be written as 𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠 (𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷) = 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘 �. Therefore, 
the same industry outcome under no subcontracting (𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 and 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = 0) yields the levels of 
horizontal subcontracting given by 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = �𝑎𝑎 − 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓  , with a ranging from 𝑎𝑎 = 0  to 𝑎𝑎 = 1. 
When 𝑎𝑎 = 0, the DF sells all its production to the competitive fringe, 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = −𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 < 0, and so 
does not interact with consumers; and when 𝑎𝑎 = 1, 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠 = �1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 > 0 and the DF is the 
only firm serving consumers. Horizontal subcontracting is thus innocuous in terms of both 
consumer surplus and industry profits. 
Summarizing, if the DF is restricted to using linear pricing to deal with consumers, then the use 
of horizontal subcontracting either cannot be rationalized or is a dull instrument in terms of its 
impact on industry performance.6  
We now analyze what happens in three further scenarios: when the DF sells the good through 
linear pricing but contracts with fringe firms can be settled on an exclusive basis, and when the 
DF sells the good through nonlinear 2PT contracts and simultaneously offers either exclusive or 
nonexclusive production contracts to the fringe.  
4.2. The DF sells through linear pricing and signs exclusive contracts with fringe firms 
In this case, the DF is restricted to offering 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 and production per plant amounts to 𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘+𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐. 
The profits stated in Eq. (8) thus become 
                                                 
6 If contracts with fringe firms were set before contracts with consumers, rather than simultaneously, the DF would 
never outsource production from the fringe under linear pricing. This was first noted for forward contracts 
(strategically similar to subcontracting) by Newbery (1984). To subcontract under linear pricing, the DF must have 
some advantage over fringe firms, as described in Antelo and Bru (2002).  
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𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐 �𝑎𝑎, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 , 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐� = 𝑎𝑎𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − (𝑘𝑘 + 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)𝑐𝑐 � 𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘+𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐� − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐)              (10) 
and the DF chooses {𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐} to maximize Eq. (10), with 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 defined by Eq. (1).  
4.3. The DF sells through nonlinear 2PT contracts and signs nonexclusive contracts with fringe 
firms 
In this case, the DF chooses {𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐} to maximize Eq. (4), where we consider that fringe firms 
offer their buyers a quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 that satisfies Eq. (1), with the DF then having to pay the same 
price 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� to fringe firms. 
4.4.  The DF sells through nonlinear 2PT contracts and signs exclusive contracts with fringe 
firms 
In this case, the DF offers customers the quantity 𝑞𝑞 that maximizes their joint profits, i.e., that 
satisfy 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) = 𝑐𝑐′ � 𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘+𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐�. It then chooses {𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐} to solve Eq. (8), with 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 defined by Eq. (1).  
The following result emerges. 
 
Proposition 1. Under scenarios (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4), the DF subcontracts production with all 
firms on the fringe, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐∗ = 1 − 𝑘𝑘, and becomes the only supplier in the industry, 𝑎𝑎∗ = 1.  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.    
 
Perhaps the most striking result from Proposition 1 is that, for (effective) horizontal 
subcontracting to emerge, the DF must sell the good to consumers through nonlinear 2PT 
contracts. The explanation is as follows. The convexity of the cost function of all the firms 
implies that, when the DF subcontracts a given amount of production to fringe firms, the 
marginal costs of these firms increase, leading them to reduce the quantity offered to their 
customers. This, in turn, reduces the consumer surplus of customers supplied by fringe firms, 
which allows the DF to charge higher prices to those customers. Since fringe firms charge the 
DF the same price as obtained by selling directly to consumers, there is now a wedge in the 
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marginal price charged by the DF and the fringe firms, 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�. In sum, the DF finds 
it profitable to subcontract production.  
Once the DF subcontracts production to fringe firms and sells the good through 2PT contracts in 
the product market, it purchases the total quantity (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 from the fringe at unit price 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 =𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�. Therefore, it offers a deal to consumers that yields consumption 𝑞𝑞 and consumer 
surplus 𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓, and that solves: 
max�𝑞𝑞,𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − [𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓] − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑞𝑞−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � − (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓�,   
s. t: 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓  defined in Eq. (1)                                                      (11) 
If the DF acquires production from fringe firms through exclusive contracts, these firms will 
accept the contracts if they obtain the same profit as would be obtained from being active in the 
final market, 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 = 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓�, with 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 according to Eq. (1). If the DF is 
restricted to selling the good through linear pricing, the price chosen is that which induces 
consumption 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 and that solves 
max 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓  �𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐�.                              (12) 
Finally, if the DF delivers the good through nonlinear 2PT contracts, it induces consumption q 
and consumer surplus 𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 that solves 
 max{𝑞𝑞,𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓} �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − [𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓] − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞) − (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐�.  (13) 
From here, we can summarize the impact of allowing the DF to sign contracts with fringe firms 
on the DF’s profits. 
 
Proposition 2. The DF’s profit increases: 
i) When the DF sells the good through nonlinear contracts, if it moves from 
nonexclusive to exclusive contracts with the fringe. 
ii) When the DF subcontracts production through exclusive contracts, if it moves from 
selling the good through linear to nonlinear contracts. 
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Proof. See the Appendix.  
 
We can also evaluate how the consumer surplus evolves with changes in the contracts available 
to the DF. 
 
Proposition 3. Regarding consumers, the following hold: 
a) Save for the case in which DF sells the good through linear contracts and acquires 
production from fringe through nonexclusive contracts, horizontal subcontracting 
harms consumers.  
b) The consumer surplus decreases: 
b.1) when the DF sells the good through nonlinear 2PT contracts, if it can move from 
nonexclusive to exclusive contracts with fringe firms. 
b.2) when the DF signs exclusive contracts with fringe firms, if it can move from selling 
the good through linear to nonlinear 2PT contracts. 
 
Proof. See the Appendix. 
 
What part (a) of Proposition 3 states is that, except when horizontal subcontracting is coupled 
with selling through linear pricing in the final market (when the consumer surplus is not 
affected), any contract between the DF and fringe firms is harmful to the end consumer. The 
equilibrium outcome, however, is not the monopoly outcome unless the DF already owns all 
production capacity: compared to monopolistic behavior, when solving Eqs. (11), (12) and (13), 
the DF chooses a larger value of 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 in order to reduce payment to the fringe.  
Part (b) of Proposition 3 shows that the DF, when selling the good through a 2PT contract and 
signing exclusive contracts to acquire production from the fringe, chooses the efficient quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓. However, with nonexclusive contracts with the fringe (horizontal subcontracting), and 
even though in equilibrium, the DF becomes the only active supplier in the industry, and the 
outcome is not equivalent to a monopoly operating under nonlinear 2PT contracting. A major 
inefficiency arises from the fact that the DF subcontracts too much production from the fringe, 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 > 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓, and end users are therefore better off than in a monopoly. The explanation is that, 
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since the fringe firms have a marginal cost 𝑐𝑐′�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� that is below 𝑈𝑈′(0), they potentially 
constitute an alternative to the DF for end users and, hence, the DF must leave them some 
consumer surplus. 
We can also see that 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 decreases in 𝑘𝑘. If 𝑘𝑘 = 1, then Eqs. (11), (12) and (13) indeed represent 
the monopoly situation. However, the interests of the DF and the fringe firms are aligned, and 
so fringe firms are better off if exclusive contracts are allowed and the DF becomes the only 
active supplier in the industry.  
5. A numerical example  
To obtain closed-form results when the DF can subcontract production from the fringe, we 
consider a numerical example consisting of customers that have preferences given by the utility 
function 𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) = �1 − 𝑞𝑞2� 𝑞𝑞, and firms with a technology described by the per-plan cost function 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄) = 𝑄𝑄2/2.  In this case, if the DF signs exclusive contracts with fringe firms and uses linear 
prices with customers, the problem stated in Eq. (12) becomes 
max𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 ��1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − 12𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓2 − (1 − 𝑘𝑘) 12 �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�2�                         (14) 
and each customer consumes the efficient quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 = 2−𝑘𝑘4−𝑘𝑘, which, whenever 0 < 𝑘𝑘 < 1, is 
below the quantity consumed if exclusive contracts between firms were prohibited, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 2−𝑘𝑘24−𝑘𝑘2. 
Contrariwise, if the DF sells the good through nonlinear 2PT contracts, the problem defined in 
Eq. (13) becomes 
max{𝑞𝑞,𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓} ��1 − 𝑞𝑞2�𝑞𝑞 − 12𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓2 − 12 𝑞𝑞2 − (1 − 𝑘𝑘) 12 �1 − 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�2�  ,             (15) 
the DF’s customers buy quantity 𝑞𝑞 = 1/2 and their consumer surplus, inferred from the 
consumption of buyers supplied by the fringe, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 1−𝑘𝑘2−𝑘𝑘, amounts to 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓2/2.  
If horizontal contracts are nonexclusive, then the DF only subcontracts production from the 
fringe if it can sell the good through nonlinear 2PT contracts. In this case, the DF subcontracts 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠1−𝑘𝑘 = 24−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘2 units from each fringe firm. Since the DF asks fringe firms to produce above the 
efficient quantity, 
𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠1−𝑘𝑘 > 12, those firms have little interest in making deals with consumers. A 
fringe firm with marginal costs 𝑐𝑐′ � 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠1−𝑘𝑘� can, in any case, offer the quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 satisfying 
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𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓) = 𝑐𝑐′ � 𝑄𝑄𝑠𝑠1−𝑘𝑘� to buyers, i.e., 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 2−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘24−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘2. This quantity is decreasing in 𝑘𝑘, but strictly 
positive unless 𝑘𝑘 = 1; hence, the DF must offer a contract that guarantees a strictly positive 
consumer surplus to its buyers, i.e., 𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 12 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓2 > 0. The DF offers end users the 
consumption level 𝑞𝑞 = 2−𝑘𝑘24−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘2, which becomes the efficient level, 𝑞𝑞 = 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = 1/2, when 𝑘𝑘 ∈
{0, 1}, but otherwise larger, 𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓. Finally, the DF can charge a positive fee 𝐹𝐹 slightly below 𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞)𝑞𝑞 − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� = 12 �𝑞𝑞2 − 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓2�.  
In sum, when the DF sells the good through nonlinear 2PT contracts, consumers are better off 
(worse off) when production contracts between the DF and fringe firms are exclusive 
(nonexclusive). Horizontal subcontracting therefore harms end users. 
From Table 1 referring to the consumer surplus, it follows that at 𝑘𝑘 = 0 (competitive industry), 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 = 1/8, whereas at 𝑘𝑘 = 1 (monopoly), 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 = 1/18 >𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 = 0 (the monopolist appropriates all rents). Finally, at 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (0, 1), the consumer 
surplus is decreasing in k in all scenarios, and, for a given value of k, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 < 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 < 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵 <𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴.  
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Likewise, from Table 2 referring to aggregate welfare, it follows that at 𝑘𝑘 = 0 (competitive 
industry), 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 = 𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶 = 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷 = 1/4, whereas at 𝑘𝑘 = 1 (monopoly), 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 = 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 = 2/9 <𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶 = 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷 = 1/4 (under 2PT, the monopolist chooses the efficient quantity). Finally, at 𝑘𝑘 ∈
(0, 1), aggregate welfare is decreasing in k under linear prices, and efficiency is always 
achieved with a 2PT and exclusive contracts. For a given value of k, it holds that 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴 <
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min {𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 ,  𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶} < max  {𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 ,  𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶} < 𝑊𝑊𝐷𝐷. Finally, 𝑊𝑊𝐵𝐵 <  𝑊𝑊𝐶𝐶  if the DF’s size is such that 
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5. Final remarks 
We have provided a rationale for the emergence of horizontal subcontracting  even when cost 
asymmetries among firms do not exist  as a stylized fact commonly observed in real-life 
industries, where large firms subcontract part of their production to smaller firms and these 
smaller firms produce for the large firm rather than for consumers. To that end, we built a 
dominant firm-competitive fringe model in which all firms can either sell their production to 
consumers through uniform prices or through (more sophisticated) nonlinear 2PT contracts.  
In a previous paper (Antelo and Bru, 2020), we showed that while firms with no market power 
to affect overall market performance use linear pricing to sell the good to their customers, the 
DF prefers to utilize nonlinear 2PT contracts; hence, intrapersonal price discrimination emerges 
in equilibrium. In contrast, therefore, with the market foreclosure literature that rationalizes 2PT 
as a barrier to entry (see Aghion and Bolton, 1987), we provide another rationale for why a 
large firm signs nonlinear 2PT contracts with smaller firms, which is their use as a collusive tool 
that favors all firms in the industry as compared to the context in which the large firm would use 
linear prices with consumers and yield allocative inefficiencies. 
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In this paper, we show that, in sharp contrast with the standard DF model where all firms are 
assumed to use uniform prices to sell the good and the DF has no advantage over fringe firms, 
there is room for the DF to subcontract production from the fringe. Indeed, we find that the DF 
purchases all the fringe’s production and thus becomes the only supplier in the industry. 
Therefore, the possibility of setting nonlinear 2PT contracts with customers, and the subsequent 
different selling methods used by the DF and fringe firms, explain the emergence of horizontal 
subcontracting practices whereby the DF acquires production from the fringe, exacerbating all 
the effects caused by intrapersonal price discrimination.  
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Proof of Proposition 1. When the DF sells the good through a nonlinear 2PT contract and 
subcontract 𝑠𝑠 units of product from fringe firms, it serves 𝑎𝑎 customers, and all customers that 
purchase from the fringe pay the unit price 𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) = 1−𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠2−𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎 and buy the quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) = 1−𝑘𝑘−𝑠𝑠2−𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎. On the other hand, the DF’s customers purchase the quantity 𝑞𝑞(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) =𝑘𝑘+𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘+𝑎𝑎 and the DF’s profits in the second stage (in which payments to the fringe are sunk), �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠)� − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑞𝑞(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠)�� 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞(𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠)−𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 �, amount to 
 𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷(𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) = 12��𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘+𝑠𝑠)�𝑘𝑘−𝑠𝑠+2𝑎𝑎+𝑘𝑘𝑎𝑎2�(𝑘𝑘+𝑎𝑎)2 − �1−𝑘𝑘−𝑠𝑠2−𝑘𝑘−𝑎𝑎�2� 𝑎𝑎 − 𝑘𝑘 �𝑎𝑎−𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘+𝑎𝑎�2�.                 (A1) 
 
Thus, the DF chooses to supply the number of buyers 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐(𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) that satisfies the FOC  𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷(𝑎𝑎,𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠)𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 = 0. In the first stage, the DF chooses to subcontract from fringe firms the quantity 𝑠𝑠 
of product that maximizes  𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷(𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠), 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) = �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞(𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠), 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠)� − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�(𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠), 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠)�� 𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) − 
                                                    −𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠)𝑞𝑞(𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠),𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠)−𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 � −𝑝𝑝(𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠),𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) 𝑠𝑠,                      (A2) 
 
where it is assumed that, in exchange of production 𝑠𝑠 purchased from the fringe, the DF must 
pay the equilibrium final price 𝑞𝑞(𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠), 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠) = 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞(𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠), 𝑘𝑘, 𝑠𝑠)�. Lastly, the DF acquires 
from fringe the quantity 𝑠𝑠 of product that satisfies the first-order condition (FOC) 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷(𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠),𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠)𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 + 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷(𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠),𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠)𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎(𝑘𝑘,𝑠𝑠)𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 = 0.                                   (A3) 
 
 
If the DF offers nonlinear 2PT contracts to consumers and horizontally subcontracts from the 
fringe, then it chooses {𝑎𝑎, 𝑞𝑞, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐} to maximize the profit given in Eq. (4). The DF’s customers 
consume the quantity 𝑞𝑞 that solves the FOC 
 
0 =
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 = 𝑎𝑎 �𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 ��                                           (A4) 
 
and, given the number of fringe firms that the DF deals with, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐, the DF’s optimal number of 




𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 = (𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) 𝑞𝑞 − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) 𝑞𝑞) − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� + 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 ,               (A5) 
 
where 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓��𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� and we use (A4) to replace 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � with 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞). The 
marginal impact of setting contracts with 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 fringe firms on the DF’s profits is 
  𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = �𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓��𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 + 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,                                             (A6) 
 
where we again use (A4) to replace 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � with 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞). Using (A5) and bearing in mind 
that 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = − 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 , the derivative given in (A6) can be rewritten as 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = �𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓��𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 + 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞)𝑞𝑞 − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓��,          (A7) 
 
which, in turn, can be rewritten, using 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 = 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓, as 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = 1 − 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑘𝑘 − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞)�𝑞𝑞 − 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�� 
=
1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 ∫ �𝑈𝑈′(𝑠𝑠) − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞)� d𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 ,                                                    (A8) 
 
with (A8) strictly positive, since 𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 and 𝑈𝑈′(𝑠𝑠) > 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) for 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 < 𝑠𝑠 < 𝑞𝑞. Therefore, in 
equilibrium, the DF becomes the only active seller in the industry, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐∗ = 1 − 𝑘𝑘. 
       If the DF sells the good through linear pricing and sets exclusive horizontal contracts with 
fringe firms, it chooses the pair {𝑎𝑎, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐} that maximizes the profit stated in Eq. (10). Given 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐, 
the DF chooses 𝑎𝑎 that solves the FOC 
 
0 =
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 = �𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐′(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 + 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 ,                                    (A9) 
 
where 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 = 𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘+𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 and 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 𝑎𝑎 �𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 + 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐′(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)� − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓. The marginal 
impact of contracts 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 on the DF’s profits is therefore  
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐′(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷) − 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓 + 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,                                    (A10) 
 
 18 
which, using (A9) and bearing in mind that 
𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = − 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 , can be written as 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐′(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷) − 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓 + �𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐′(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓,                      (A11) 
 
i.e., as 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = 𝑐𝑐′(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷) − �𝑐𝑐′(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓�� 
= ∫ �𝑐𝑐′(𝑠𝑠) − 𝑐𝑐′(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)�d𝑠𝑠𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷                                                            (A12) 
 
with (A12) strictly positive, since 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 > 𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷. Therefore, in equilibrium, the DF again becomes 
the only active seller in the industry, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐∗ = 1 − 𝑘𝑘. 
Finally, if the DF uses nonlinear 2PT contracts to sell the good and sets exclusive 
horizontal contracts with fringe firms, it chooses {𝑎𝑎, 𝑞𝑞, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐} to maximize the profit given in Eq. 
(8). The DF’s customers consume 𝑞𝑞 that solves the FOC 
 
0 =
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞 = 𝑎𝑎 �𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑐𝑐′ � 𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘+𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐��                                       (A13) 
 
and, given the number of fringe firms that the DF deals with, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐, the DF’s optimal number of 
consumers 𝑎𝑎 is that which satisfies the FOC 
 
0 =
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 = (𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞)𝑞𝑞) − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� + 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 ,               (A14) 
 
where 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓��𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� and we use (A4) to replace 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑎𝑎𝑞𝑞−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � with 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞). The 
marginal impact of the set of contracts with 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 fringe firms on the DF’s profits is 
  𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = �𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)� − 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓 + 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓  𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐,                                             (A15) 
 




𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = �𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝐷𝐷)� − 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓 + 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �(𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞)𝑞𝑞) − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓��.      
(A16) 
 
If we define 𝑄𝑄(𝑠𝑠) ≡ argmax𝑄𝑄  (𝑈𝑈′(𝑠𝑠)𝑄𝑄 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄)), where 𝑄𝑄′(𝑠𝑠) = 𝑈𝑈′′(𝑠𝑠)𝑐𝑐′′(𝑄𝑄) < 0, then (A16) 
becomes 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐𝜕𝜕𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 = ∫ 𝑈𝑈′′(𝑠𝑠) �𝑄𝑄(𝑠𝑠) − 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 𝑠𝑠�d𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓                                      (A17) 
 
and (A17) is strictly positive since 𝑄𝑄�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� = 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 and 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠 �𝑄𝑄(𝑠𝑠) − 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 𝑠𝑠� = 𝑄𝑄′(𝑠𝑠) −1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 < 0 implies that 𝑄𝑄(𝑠𝑠) − 1−𝑎𝑎1−𝑘𝑘−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 𝑠𝑠 < 0 for 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 < 𝑠𝑠 < 𝑞𝑞. Therefore, in equilibrium, the DF 
becomes the only supplier in the industry and, as result, 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐∗ = 1 − 𝑘𝑘.                            ■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 2. It is immediate that, for any given interaction with fringe firms (no 
contracts, nonexclusive contracts or exclusive contracts), the DF’s profits increase when 
contracts with customers move from linear pricing to nonlinear 2PT contracts, because a 2PT 
can always replicate a linear price, and the DF always chooses a contract that leads to 𝑞𝑞 > 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓, 
which means that there is an increase in the joint surplus for the relationship between the DF 
and buyers, and the DF can appropriate this surplus increase. 
 
If the DF is restricted to offering linear prices to consumers, then it solves7  
 
max𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓  𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� = 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � − (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓,      (A18) 
 
under nonexclusive horizontal contracts and 
 
max𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓  𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙,𝑛𝑛�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� = 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐  ,                    (A19) 
 
under exclusive horizontal contracts, where 𝜋𝜋𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐 = 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 − 𝑐𝑐(𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓) and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 satisfies Eq. (1). If 
we evaluate 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙,𝑛𝑛�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� at the quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 that solves (A18), we have 
 
                                                 
7 Recall that the DF has the same profits as those achieved in the absence of horizontal contracts with 
fringe firms. 
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 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙,𝑛𝑛�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� = 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� + �𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � + (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑐𝑐�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓��,     (A20) 
 
which is larger than 𝜋𝜋𝑙𝑙,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�, because 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � + (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑐𝑐�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� > 𝑐𝑐�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�. Therefore, 
under linear pricing to sell the good, the DF can achieve larger profits when horizontal 
subcontracting moves from nonexclusive to exclusive contracts. 
 
If the DF can offer nonlinear 2PT contracts to consumers, profits under nonexclusive horizontal 
contracts are those given in Eq. (11), which, according to Proposition 1, are larger than those 
achieved when no horizontal contracts exist, while profits under exclusive horizontal contracts 
are those in Eq. (13). If we evaluate the profits given in Eq. (13) at the quantities 𝑞𝑞 and 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 that 
solve Eq. (11), we have 
 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐,𝑛𝑛�𝑞𝑞, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� = 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑞𝑞, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� + �𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑞𝑞−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � + (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑐𝑐�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞)�,   (A21) 
 
which is larger than 𝜋𝜋𝑐𝑐,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛�𝑞𝑞, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�, because 𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐 �𝑞𝑞−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � + (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑐𝑐�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� > 𝑐𝑐(𝑞𝑞). Therefore, 
under nonlinear 2PT pricing, the DF can obtain larger profits when subcontracting exists if it 
moves from nonexclusive to exclusive contracts.                                                                ■ 
 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  
 
Assume that the DF sells through linear pricing. According to Proposition 1, the DF 
monopolizes sales, a=1, when there is subcontracting from fringe firms, in which case 
customers have the consumer surplus 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� = 𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠, where 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 is the quantity 
that solves Eqs. (11), (12) and (13). On the other hand, with no subcontracting, customers obtain 
the same consumer surplus if the DF supplies a number of buyers 𝑎𝑎� that leads fringe firms to 
offer the quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠. Thus, 𝑎𝑎� must satisfy 
 
 
1−𝑎𝑎�1−𝑘𝑘 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 = 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠.            (A22) 
 
Customers are better off if the DF choose to serve a number of buyers a such that 𝑎𝑎 > 𝑎𝑎�, since 
according to Eq. (7), 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 is increasing in a. We see below that this is indeed the case. 
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If the DF sells the good through linear pricing, customers are worse off if subcontracting is by 
means of exclusive contracts than in the absence of horizontal subcontracting. In fact, when 
there is no subcontracting, the DF maximizes the profit given in Eq. (10) and chooses quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 that solves the problem stated in Eq. (11). On the other hand, under subcontracting with 
exclusive contracts, the DF solves the problem defined in Eq. (12), whose FOC is  
 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 + 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑐𝑐′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − (1 − 𝑘𝑘) 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 = 0,                          (A23) 
 
where 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 denote the quantities 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 that solve Eq. (1) and (A23). Using (A22), we 
can rewrite (A23) as  
 𝑎𝑎� 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 + 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑐𝑐′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� = 0.                                  (A24) 
 
If we evaluate the FOC at 𝑎𝑎�, we have 
 
                    
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 �𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎� = �𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑎𝑎�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 �� �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 + 𝑎𝑎� 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 � + 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠  𝑎𝑎 � 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎        
= −𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠  𝑎𝑎� �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 − (1 − 𝑎𝑎�) 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 � = −𝑎𝑎� �𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�2𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 1−𝑎𝑎�1−𝑘𝑘 𝑐𝑐′�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� > 0,     (A25) 
 
where we use Eq. (7) and (A24). Thus, the DF chooses 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 > 𝑎𝑎� when there is no subcontracting 
and customers are worse off than if there is horizontal subcontracting. 
Assume now that the DF offers nonlinear 2PT contracts to consumers. In this case, 
consumers are worse off if, in addition, there is nonexclusive subcontracting. With 2PT 
contracts and no subcontracting, the DF chooses the pair {𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 , 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐} that solves the problems given 
in Eqs. (13) and (14), and 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐  that satisfies Eq. (6). With nonlinear 2PT contracts with customers 
and nonexclusive subcontracting, the DF chooses the pair �𝑞𝑞, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� that solves the FOCs  
 
0 =





𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐+𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� ��𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� + 1−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐′′�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓��𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓���,         (A26) 
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where, from Eq. (17), 
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑐𝑐′′(𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓). Let us denote by 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 the values of the quantities 𝑞𝑞, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 and 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 that solve Eqs. (1), (A25) and (A26), respectively. With horizontal subcontracting, 
customers obtain the consumer surplus 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠. Using (A22), we have 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 −
(1 − 𝑘𝑘) 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 = 𝑎𝑎� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠, and this equality and (A25) allow us to rewrite FOC given in (A26) as 
 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� �𝑎𝑎 �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 + 1−𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐′′�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� �𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠) − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠��� = 0 ,          (A27) 
 
which implies 
 𝑎𝑎� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠  𝑐𝑐"(𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠)1−𝑘𝑘 = 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠).           (A28) 
 
Therefore, using Eq. (7) and (A28), the derivative of the profit stated in Eq. (10) evaluated at 𝑎𝑎� 
becomes 
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 �𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎� = �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�� − −�𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠)� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 1−𝑎𝑎�1−𝑘𝑘 𝑐𝑐′′(𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠),          (A29) 
  
where 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 is the value that solves the problem given in Eq. (13) evaluated at 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎�. We thus 
have  
 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 �𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎� > �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�� − �𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠)� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 
                           > �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 − �𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�� − �𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)� 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 
                           = �𝑈𝑈(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) − 𝑈𝑈�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�� − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)�𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 − 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� 
                           = ∫ �𝑈𝑈′(𝑠𝑠) − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐)�𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠    
                           > 0,  
     (A30) 
 
where the first inequality comes from the fact that 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠) > 0 and 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 1−𝑎𝑎�1−𝑘𝑘 𝑐𝑐′′(𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠) ∈ (0, 1). To prove this, first note that 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 < 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠. Assume otherwise that 
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𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 < 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠, in which case 𝑈𝑈′′ < 0 implies 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠) > 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠�. From Eq. (1) and (A25) we 
have 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � > 𝑐𝑐′�𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓�. We can therefore see that 𝑐𝑐′′ > 0 means that 𝑞𝑞−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 > 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 ⇒ 𝑞𝑞 > 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓; however, in (A20) we must have 𝑞𝑞 < (1 − 𝑘𝑘) 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓, which 
contradicts the above. Therefore, we must have 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 < 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 and since 𝑈𝑈′′ < 0, we then 
have 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� > 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠) as stated. The second inequality, on the other hand, holds from 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 >𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 at 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑎𝑎�. In fact, we know that 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐) = 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑎𝑎�𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐𝑘𝑘 �, whereas from (A19) and (A21), we 
can see that 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 satisfies 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠) = 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 � = 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠−(1−𝑎𝑎�)𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 � = 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑎𝑎�𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 + 𝑋𝑋�, 
where 𝑋𝑋 = (1−𝑎𝑎�)(𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠−𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠)𝑘𝑘 > 0. Since 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 is decreasing in X, 𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 = 𝑐𝑐"𝑈𝑈"−𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑐𝑐" < 0, we have 𝑞𝑞𝑐𝑐 > 𝑞𝑞𝑠𝑠 as stated. Finally, the fact that 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐷𝐷𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 �𝑎𝑎=𝑎𝑎� > 0 implies that the DF chooses 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 > 𝑎𝑎� when 
there is no horizontal subcontracting with the fringe and that customers are worse off if there is 
horizontal subcontracting. 
That consumers are worse off if subcontracting moves from nonexclusive to exclusive 
contracts can be proved as follows. If the DF sells the good through nonlinear 2PT contracts and 
it horizontally sets exclusive contracts with fringe firms, it chooses the quantities 𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 and 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 
that maximize the problem given in Eq. (13), namely the quantities that solve the FOCs  
 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 ) − 𝑐𝑐′(𝑞𝑞𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 ) = 0     (A31) 
 
and 
  𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠��𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 − (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠� = 0,     (A32) 
 
where, in addition, 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 satisfies Eq. (1), which can be written as 
 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠� − 𝑐𝑐′ � 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠1−𝑘𝑘� =  0     (A33) 
 
if we use (A32). If, on the other hand, there is nonexclusive horizontal subcontracting, the DF 
chooses, according to (A26), 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 > 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠1−𝑘𝑘 and thus Eq. (1) can be written as  
 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠� − 𝑐𝑐′ � 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠1−𝑘𝑘 − 𝐶𝐶� =  0     (A34) 
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for 𝐶𝐶 > 0. From (A33) and (A34) it follows that 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 < 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 and, therefore, customers end up with 
a smaller consumer surplus when subcontracting moves from nonexclusive to exclusive 
contracts. 
 
Assume now that the DF sets nonexclusive contracts with fringe firms, as well as nonlinear 2PT 
contracts instead of linear prices with its customers. With linear prices, the DF’s optimal 
quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 is the quantity that makes the derivative of the DF’s profit with respect to 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 zero, 
i.e., 
 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓��𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� − �(1 − 𝑘𝑘) 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑐𝑐"(𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓) − 1��𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 �� = 0,   (A35) 
 
where, from Eq. (1), 
𝜕𝜕𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝜕𝜕𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 = 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑐𝑐"(𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓) . On the other hand, with nonlinear 2PT contracts with 
customers, the optimal quantities �𝑞𝑞, 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 ,𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� simultaneously satisfy Eqs. (1), (A25) and (A26). 
If we evaluate (A35) at these quantities, it follows that 
 −(1 − 𝑘𝑘) 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓�𝑐𝑐"(𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓) �𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 �� + �𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 �� > 0,         (A36) 
 
since both 𝑈𝑈′(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � and 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐′ �𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓−(1−𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑘𝑘 � are positive. Hence, under 
linear prices the DF chooses a larger quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 and buyers are better off than under 2PT. 
  
Finally, assume a context in which the DF sets exclusive contracts with fringe firms and is 
allowed to offer nonlinear 2PT contracts instead of linear pricing to buyers. With linear prices, 
the FOC of problem given in Eq. (12) is 
 𝑈𝑈′′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓��𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 − (1 − 𝑘𝑘)𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓� + 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� = 0,           (A37) 
 
where 𝑈𝑈′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� − 𝑐𝑐′�𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓� > 0 and thus 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓 < 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓1−𝑘𝑘. With nonlinear 2PT contracts to sell the good, 
the FOCs of problem stated in Eq. (13) are given by (A31) and (A32), with 𝑄𝑄𝑓𝑓𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠 = 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠1−𝑘𝑘. A 
similar reasoning to that used in (A33) and (A34) leads the DF to choose a lower quantity 𝑞𝑞𝑓𝑓 






The Mathematica file shows that, for values of k in the interval [0.698878 , 1], in equilibrium, 
the DF becomes the only seller in the market, i.e., 𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐 = 1, where superscript 𝑐𝑐 indicates that the 
DF sets a nonlinear 2PT contract with customers, and thus subcontracts all the fringe’s 
production. Note that despite the DF becoming a de facto monopolist in the market, consumers 
have a strictly positive surplus whenever 𝑘𝑘 < 1, although they are worse off than when the DF 
cannot subcontract production from the fringe.                     
 
Appendix S1  
 
Further proofs (pdf file).                                                                                        ￭ 
 
 
 
